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The purpose of this ATM is to document the results of the Reliability/ 
Engineering investigation of the overvoltage condition that occurred while 
performing the Flight II Central Station power dissipation test. The objective 
was to assess the flight worthiness of the C/S components and to identify any 
overstressed piece parts. 
The investigation was accomplished in two phases: a functional PIA 
checkout at hot, cold and ambient temperatures for each C/S component; 
and an analytical analysis of each components 1 parts application. In addition, 
a special evaluation test on the Fairchild .JJ.A702 andf(A709 operational 
amplifiers, used in the Command Decoder and Power Dist·dbution Unit, 
has been performed. The results of this test will be covered under a 
separate report, ATM 801, scheduled for issl-e October 1, 1968. A brief 
discussion 1s included in this report. 
In summary, the following abnormalities were disclosed. 
1. Both transmitters S /N-11 & 15 were inoperative as a result of 
the overvoltage. These units were removed and returned to the 
vendor. Transmitters S /N 10 and 2 0 were installed in Flight II. 
2. The Command Receiver {SN7) was replaced with S/N 8. 
Preliminary checkout of S/N 7 at ambient temperature indicated 
no evidence of damage, however, be cause of schedule considerations 
it was more expedient to use S /N8 as the Flight II unit. 
3. Resistor R33 in the PCU Switching Module was stressed in 
excess of its rated power. At Bendix's request, the manufacturer 
subjected identical parts to the same overvoltage condition to 
determine the degree of degradation or change in resistive value. 
The hot spot temperature rise caused a change in resistance of 
approximately O. 33%. This resistance shift is well within 
acceptable circuit application limits. Visual examination at 
X90 magnification showed no evidence of permanent damage. 
This test is considered a worst case application since it was 
performed in free air. The actual resistor is coated and heat 
sinked with Sty cast 235 0 FT which has good thermal properties, 
thus minimizing the hot-spot temperatures. 
4. The Fairchild,.uA702 and;uA709 operational amplifiers were 
stressed beyond the nanufacturers maximum specified ratings. 
Although functionally these parts showed no evidence of damage 
during system checkout, the special test previously mentioned is 
designed to assess what detrimental effects the overvoltage may have 
induced relative to the op amps transfer function and common mode 
offset voltage. The stability of these parameters were measured and 
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recorded as a function of voltage and time. The overvoltage 
application was duplicated then repeated, doubling the exposure 
time. The test results showed no evidence of damage. 
5. Functional PIA checkouts and comparison with the original 
PIA test results disclosed no evidence of damage (transmitters 
excepted) attributable to the applied overvoltage condition. 
It has been concluded from this investigation, that the central station 
assemblies, with exception to the transmitters were not adversely degraded 
as a result of the applied overvoltage, Therefore, the Flight II central 
station, as presently configured is considered flight worthy. 
Description of Malfunction 
The Flight II C/S power dissipation test was in progress per test procedure 
2337925. The C/S was operating on PCU #1. In accordance with paragraph 
6. 5. 3.1. 1, Command SET 2 (OCTAL 062}, "PCU #2 Select", was trans-
mitted. After command execution the 12V Sense Meter on the STS pegged 
at the maximum value. Emergency RTG Shut off procedure was performed. 
The malfunction was traced to an operator erro/The break-out-box 
(B. 0. B. ) connected between C/S out put connect9r J24 and P24 had a jumper 
cable missing. The missing jumper effected a,f. open loop in the PCU #2 
regulator shunt resistor /transistor circuit. '\!fhe open circuit permitted 
the +16 volts to the PCU inverter to increase to +26V, thus resulting in the 
following system overvoltage condition. 
Nominal Supply Voltage 
+29V 
+15V 
+12V 
+ 5V 
- 6V 
+16V 
-12V 
Overvoltage Condition 
+47. 2V 
+23. 4V 
+19.5V 
+ 8. lV 
- 9. 75V 
+26V 
-20V 
The duration of this overvoltage condition was determined to be one (1) 
minute. The amplitude of the overvoltage was calculated on the basis of 
50 watts of reserve power available in the PCU. This represents the worst 
case condition. Start up and initial system check out disclosed that 
Transmitters A & B were inoperative. 
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Investigation Results 
A joint failure analysis investigation was undertaken by Reliability and 
Engineering to ascertain the degree of degradation experienced by the C/S 
electronic subsystems. 
To determine the functional status of the C/S subsystems, each unit was 
subjected to a Hot-Cold-Ambient PIA test. With exception to the Transmitters, 
S/N 11 and 15 all subsystems passed with no evidence of failures. Both 
transmitters were found to be inoperative. 
The "as -run" test data was compared with the original PIA test data for 
each respective subsystems. The objective was to determine if ai'Y discernable 
shift, off set, etc. , was evident that might indicate that some deg::"adation 
occurred as a result of the overvoltage condition. The test data was found to 
be within acceptable tolerance limits specified by the test procedures. No 
significant deviations were noted to indicate evidence of damage and/or 
degradation present in the C/S subsystems. 
The above PIA test established the operational status of the C/S electronic 
subsystems. However, to determine which components (piece part) were 
overstressed, an analytical analysis of each subsystem's electronics was 
performed. The analysis was extended to all suhsystems exposed to the 
overvoltage condition and are tabulated below. 
l. Transmitters - S/N 11 and 15 
2. Receiver, S/N 7 
3. Command Decoder S/N 5 
4. Data Processor, S/N 7 
5. 90Channel Multiplexer/Converter, S/N 10 
6, Power Distribution Unit, SIN 7 
7. Power Conditioning Unit, S /N 5 
8. Passive Seismic C/S Electronics, S/N 2 
It was recognized by Bendix that a comprehensive analysis was essential 
if the flight worthiness of the system was to be assured. This was accom-
plished through the use of the existing Parts Application Analysis {PAA), 
for each assembly. By use of the FAA's, a auick reference was available 
to identify those parts that were potentially overstressed while effectively 
eliminating undue time spent on parts that obviously would not be damaged 
as a result of the overvoltage condition. 
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An understanding of the failure mechanisms of the parts utilized in ALSEP 
is essential in order to determine what degradation or catastrophic effects may 
have occurred. There are two basic damage and/or failure mechanisms which 
may result from an overvoltage condition. The first relates to direct voltage 
breakdown which might occur in capacitors operated beyond their rated 
voltages, or in semiconductor junctions when reverse bias is excessive. The 
second mechanism of damage occurs from excessive current through a part, 
which, although used within its voltage rating, its power dissipation (I2R) 
becomes excessive. This mechanism would apply to resistors, thermistors, 
coils, transformers, and semiconducting devices operating in the forward 
biased condition. These mechanisms, as they apply to types of parts are 
discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
Non-Electrolytic Capacitors {Types CKR, ECY, CMR, VKR, WOMZ) 
The non-electrolytic capacitors selected and applied in the Central Station 
all have ratings well above the 29V primary, thus the overvoltage condition 
cited would not result in any instance where the rated continuous working 
voltage was exceeded. 
Electrolytic Capacitors (Types CSR, 16K, and 202D) 
The electrolytic capacitors are applied by standard derating practice 
(refer to ATM-241) at less than 67% of their rated voltage. In certain cases, 
experienced overvoltage condition could cause the applied voltage to approach 
or exceed the parts rating and therefore required careful scrutinizing. 
Electrolytic capacitors do carry a surge voltage rating about l5o/o greater 
than the continuous rating, thus providing additional margin for transient 
states. No electrolytic capacitors were found to have exceeded their 
manufacturer's rating. 
Resistors, Composition, Film and Wirewound (Types RCR, RNR, R WR & RER 
The majority of resistors utilized are generally applied at less than 30o/o of 
their continuous power dissipation rating {ATM-241 ). Considering the worst 
case application of 5O% rated power, a 50% voltage surge results in an increase 
of 12% more than the rated continuous power. These resistors are capable of 
Withstanding a minim~m of double the rated power. In the case of the RNR 
series, these resistors are typically burned-in at five (5} times rated power 
for one hour. Only two resistors were identified to have exceeded their rating, 
and are discussed elsewhere in this report. Thermistors and temperature 
sensors are applied at small fractions of their power-handling capability, 
thus the overload would only result in temporary inaccuracy due to self-heating. 
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Coils, chokes and transformers subjected to current overloads will rise 
in temperature in accordance with their thermal dissipation capability. Chokes 
and transformers in the PCU are thermally lagged to the structure, and are 
fabricated to MIL-T-2 7 class temperature which provides adequate margin for 
short (1-minute) current overloads. 
Relays (Types BR17, BR20 and Teledyne Current Sensors) 
Relays used in the Central Station fall into two different application 
categories: 
(a) Babcock BR17 and BR2 0 latching relays are used for power 
control by ground station command and operate from a 
short duration pulse provided by the command decoder 
logic. The majority of these relays were not energized 
during the transient condition described, hence not effected. 
The excepted case is the transmitter select relay in the PDU. 
(b) Teledyne current sensing relays are connected in series 
with power lines to the experiments and/or subsystems. 
These relays are performing their normal function when 
energized as a result of an overload situation such as 
existed. 
The transmitters 1 select relay and current sensing relays are covered 
in greater depth in the PDU section of this report. 
Diodes, Rectifiers and Switching 
Semiconductor diodes are applied well within their voltage and power 
dissipation ratings and the transient condition described in general would 
not produce any overload condition greater than the device 1s capability. 
Diodes, Zeners 
Voltage regulator (zener) diodes are operated at a "Zener Current 11 
rating, which under light loads produces rated power in the diode. The 
characteristic curve for zener diodes is very non-linear in the operating 
region and an increase in applied voltage can produce an excessive current 
through the diode if the current-limiting resistor is small. This case would 
apply if the regulated voltage is only slightly less than the supply voltage. 
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Actual load conditions for different zener currents and load resistances were 
established by calculation for the overvoltage condition. No misapplications 
were found to exist. 
Transistors 
Because of the variety of methods used in biasing transistors, and the 
different methods of loading these devices, it was necessary to investigate 
each circuit application for possible excessive dissipation, or voltage greater 
than rated maximum. Transistors found to have experienced an overstressed 
condition are covered in greater depth elsewhere in this report. 
Integrated Circuits 
Digital - The low-power DT L logic circuits (9 040, 9 041 & 9 042) are 
rated at 6V, and applied in ALSEP at 5V. However, Fairchild tests these 
circuits for 8V capability which was only slightly exceeded (0. 1 V max) 
during the overvoltage state. The new specification sheets rate and test 
these DTL logic circuits at 8V thus providing the same condition experienced 
during the ALSEP overvoltage condition. On the basis of this information, 
it has been concluded the Fairchild digital logic circuits were not stressed 
beyond their capability, hence their reliability was not degraded. 
TI and Westinghouse Logic Circuits utilized in the system are rated 
at 1 OV, hence were not overstressed. 
Linear - The Fairchild J...(A702A and J(A709C operational amplifiers were 
stressed beyond the ma~u£"icturer 's specified rating for their respective 
applications. Although, f1mc~l.onally these elements checked out in the 
system with no evidenre of degradation, additional tests have been per-
formed at the piece part level and will be reportE:d in a separate document. 
702A - The 702A circuit is rated for a maximum supply voltage difference 
of 21V and is characterized at V+ = 12, V- = 6V. Input voltage maximum 
ratings are +1. 5V or -6V with a maximum differential of 5V, either polarity. 
The nominal power supply voltages in the ALSEP application are +12V and 
-6V. The transient condition resulted in a maximum difference of 19.5 
and -9. 75 or 29. 25V exceeding the rated maximum by 8. 25V. 
709C-The 709 circuit is rated for maximum supply voltages of +18V 
and is characterized at +15V. Input voltage maximum ratings are +lOV with 
an allowable differentialvoltage of ~5V. The nominal power supply voltages 
in the ALSEP application are +12V, and during the fault may have reached 
+19. 5 and -20V, exceeding the rated maximum voltage by 3. 5V. 
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Fairchild was contacted to determine the allowable margins relative to the 
maximum voltage ratings. However, identification of the allowable overstress 
tolerances was inconclusive in that such data are not available. Conseouently, 
BxA Reliability performed an evaluation test on sample units drawn from stock. 
The test was designed to measure the stability of the op-amp 1 s transfer function 
and common mode offset voltage as a function of an overvoltage exposure. 
Examination of the test data confirms the ,£{A702 and.{{.t\709 op-amp were not 
degraded as a result of the applied overvoltage. The results of this test will 
be published in a separate report {ATM 801 ). The test is being continued to 
determine the allowable safety margin inherent in these devices before 
deterioration of their parametric functions is detected. 
Transmitter Assembly S/N 11 & 15 
The transmitters were the only assemblies found to fail catastrophically. 
At the time of the overvoltage condition occurred., Transmitter B(S/N-15) 
was on. When the +29V supply increased to 47V, the +29V overload sensor 
tripped, * transferring power to transmitter A(S/N-11 ). It is suspected, 
that prior to transfer of power, the overvoltage caused a failure in the 
Power Amplifier module. Because the overvoltage condition was still present, 
the same failure mechanism was repeated in Transmitter A. 
Both transmitters were returned to the vendc1 for fault isolation and 
repair. As a result of the initial failure and stress analysis inv~stigation 
by Bendix, the following cornponents are suspected of being overstressed: 
Module 
Al, XZ Control Amplifier 
AZ, XZ Pwr. Amplifier 
A4, X4 Multiplier 
Part 
Q3-2N3866 
Ql-2N4012 
Q2-2N4012 
R3 
R4 
CRI-L8654F 
Stressed 
Parameter 
V CE>47V 
V >47V 
V CE 47V CE7 
p diss /Prated= I. 01 
pd. /P t d=l. 01 1s s ra e 
Pdo /P t d=l. 0 1s s ra e 
Rating 
BV CE0=30V 
BV CE0=40V 
BV CE0=40V 
Other components in the transmitter do not appear to have been overstressed 
and should be satisfactory for continued use as flight hardware. 
The resistors, R3 and R4, in module AZ should not constitute a 
problem for continued use. The vendor has a contract to perform a 
detailed analysis and to repair the Xmtrs. Their analysis will be studied 
by BxA Reliability & Engineering for concurrence with their replacement 
r ec ommenda tions. 
*It is possible the +lZV overload sensor caused the transferring of power to 
the alternate transmitter. However, the identified failures indicate the over-
load occurred in the +29V line. 
MO. 
ATM 
800 
PAGI 9 
RIV. MO. 
OF 14 
Investigation of Flight II Central Station 
Overvoltage Condition OAT I 9/12/68 
Receiver - S/N 7 
Receiver S/N 7 has been removed from the Flight II CIS and replaced 
with S/N 8. Preliminary checkout of S/N 7 showed no evidence of damage. 
However, the receiver was replaced to allow for a more thorough checkout 
and evaluation to ascertain its flight worthiness. 
Data Processor, Digital (S/N 7} 
At the time of overvoltage, Data Processor Y was energized, The 
Data Processor does not feature automatic switchover, hence, only the Y 
side was suspect for possible damage. With exception to the network 
calibration circuit, and oscillator assembly, the Data Processor is composed 
of Fairchild DTL 9040, 9041, and 9042 micro logic elements. As stated 
previously, the +8V overvoltage was within the acceptable limits specified 
by Fairchild. All other discrete components (resistors, transistors, 
diodes, etc.) operated well within their power and voltage ratings. 
9 0 Channel Multiplexer I Converter - SIN 1 0 
The FET analog gates and FET gate drive circuits were the prime 
candidates for damage and/or failure resulting from the applied overvoltage, 
The analysis dis closed that the PNP transistors (Dynatronics P /N 04-000091-1) 
were subjected to an overvoltage from collector to emitter which exceeded the 
specified minimum BV CEO rating of the part. BV CEO for the subject part is 
specified at 30V minimum. During the overvoltage period, the applied 
collector-to-emitter voltage was 34V. 
The transistor in question is a high speed switching device. When in 
the OFF state, which is the critical condition, the transistors breakdown 
voltage is analogous to BV CER for one application, and BV CES for the other. 
The BV CER situation exists by virtue of a 4. 7K.£Lresistor between the base 
and emitter; and BV CES by virtue for a forward biased diode coupling the 
base and emitter for the latter application. 
According to Texas Instruments, the BV CES rating of the transistor 
approximates its BV CBO rating which is typically measured at 7 SV. BV CER 
is generally specified for a value of lKAbetween the base and emitter and 
will measure at some value less than, but approaching BV CBO· For an 
impedance of 4. 7K it can be concluded that BV CE for the circuit application 
is greater than the specified BV CEO although less than BV CBO" 
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Measured test data by T. I. for the subject part records the typical BV CEo=55V, 
and the three sigma limit BV CEO(MIN)=45V. Because the BV CEO 
condition is the lowest voltage rating for an applied potential across the collector 
to emitter, circuit design parameters are limited to the lower or minimum 
specified value to ensure reliable operation. However, for the given circuit 
application combined v:lith a high probability the actual breakdown voltage was 
less than 45V, results in the conclusion no damage or degradation has occurred 
as a result of the overvoltaP:e condition. 
No other piece parts utilized in the Multiplexer I Converter were found 
to exceed their respective ratings. 
Power Distribution Unit - SIN 7 
The relay(s) for the transmitter power control and the .L{A709 Fairchild 
operational amplifiers for the RTG Junction temperatures, PCU Reserve 
Power Sensors, and the Dust Detector Photo cell sensors, were subjected 
to an abnormal operating mode. 
For the one minute duration while the overvoltage condition existed, 
the transmitter 1s circuit breakers in the +29V line * detected and generated a 
power transfer command from one transmitter to the other. Because the 
~v~rvoltage condition existed regardless of which transmitter was operating, 
1t lS suspected the power control relays oscillated back and forth at a 
frequency commensurate v:lith the delay times of the circuit breakers and 
re.lays. T~~ occurred until the power amplifier frequency doubler transistor 
falled open. The parts in question are Babcock relay (BR17) K4, and 
Teledyne current sensors CB 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
Assuming this condition occurred for a 5ms pull-in time, the number of 
actuation estimated to have occurred during the l minute overvoltage period 
is calculated to be 12, 000. The opem tional life requirement for the relays 
in question is l 00, 000 cycles. Therefore, the operational life was not 
exceeded and was verified by the functional checkout of the P. D. U. A 
conservative estimate of the number of actuations this relay v:lill be reauired 
to perform is less than l, 000. Therefore, the cyclic life is not expected 
to be exceeded. 
* Though unlikely, the power transfer could have resulted from an overload 
in the +l2V supply line. 
** This transistor is located in the Transmitter Assembly. 
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However, a potentially more critical problem is the damage to the 
relay contacts as a result of switching of an inductive load. This application 
is critical to the K4 relay only, since the circuit breaking contacts are 
switching ground signals in the base circuit for the K4 relay drive transistors. 
In the case of relay K4, which switches the +29V and +12V supplies, the 
load looking into the transmitters is inductive. However, an analysis of 
the circuit dis closes that the overload current sensors, in series with the 
relay contacts will trip at 700 rna and 150 rna respectively for the +29V and 
+12V supplies. The contact rating for the K4 relay is 1. 0 amp inductive. 
Therefore, it has been concluded that, even though the relay and overload 
current sensors were operated in an abnormal manner, the properties of 
the suspected parts were not degraded. 
The operational amplifiers (i{A709) are specified to operate between 
+18 Volts. The nominal operating voltage is +12 Volts. However, during 
the transient state these Op-amps saw approximately 40V, or 4 volts above 
the maximum specified rating. Because Fairchild could not guarantee 
operation beyond the specified rating, a special test designed to nl~:.:lsu-rp 
degradational effects as a function of overvoltag:! was conducted. Evalua-
tion of the test· data confirmed the op-amps were not degraded and therefore 
are considered flight worthy. 
All other components within the PDU were found to be within their 
specified ratings. Excepting the transmitter circuit discussed above, c..ll 
other relays and circuit breakers remained in a de-energized state, thus not 
functionally exercised or stressed. Resistors, capacitors and diodes were 
well within their manufacturers 1 ratings. The relay drive transistor 
(BxA #2 3351911) was only subjected to approximately 86% of its BV CEO 
rating which was the worst case application found for any transistor(s ). 
The digital logic elements, as stated previously, did not exceed the allowable 
test levels specified by Fairchild, 
Command Decoder - S/N 5 
The FairchildL{A702A operational amplifiers in the Demodulator 
constitute the most serious potential problem. These integrated circuits 
are rated for 21 volts. As stated previously, the applied voltage across 
them during the transient state was 29.25V. The successful completion of 
the P. I. A. tests indicates no detrimental effects resulted from the applied 
overvoltage. However, certification as to th~ flight worthiness of the 
/{A 7 02A was confirmed based on the results of the special evaluation test. 
For a comprehensive report, refer to ATM 801. 
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Three electrolytic capacitors {C3, C5 and Cl9) were stressed to their 
maximum voltage rating. However, these capacitors have current limiting 
resistors and therefore are not believed to have been degraded. The remain-
ing passive and semiconducting parts were found to be operating below their 
manufacturers 1 rating. 
PCU- S/N 5 
As previously stated, the open loop condition in the PCU #2 regulator 
was the cause of the Flight II overvoltage mishap. While the overvoltage 
condition existed, the analysis disclosed two {2) resistors were stressed 
beyond their nominal power rating. The identified resistors are listed 
below. 
OVERSTRESSED RESISTORS 
Submodule Symbol Ohms Overvoltage Rating Stress 
Ratio 
Regulator B R37 909JL ll.5V o. l w 146% 
Over/Under R33 301 .JL 15. 5V 0.1 w 800% 
Switch 
Since the two overstressed resistors are MIL RNR Film Resistors 
that are burned in at 5 times rated power for one hour, it is apparent that 
R37 was capable of handling the 146% overload it dissipated for one minute. 
R33, however, dissipated 8 times rated power for the one minute during 
which the Switching Module, sensed an overvoltage. Mepco Inc., the supplier 
of the R33 resistors, was contacted to determine the effect of such an over-
load condition. Several RNR 55E resistors were drawn from Mepco's 
stock and repeatedly exposed, in air, to 8 times rated power. In approximately 
13 to 15 seconds, the resistor's temperature rose l00°C above ambient. 
After one minute, the hot spot temperature rose to approximately 180° 
to l84°C and the resistance drifted approximately 0. 33o/o. Examination of 
the resistors under 90x magnification showed no damage. Mepco stated 
that the critical temperature for these resistors is 175 °C but, as a result 
of their test, if exposure to the 800% overload is limited to one minute and 
that the application conducted heat away better than free air, the resistor 
would function normally. 
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R33 is packaged in a cordwood assembly and conformally coated 
with Sty cast 2 85OFT. (Refer to Figure l} Sty cast has good conductivity 
and therefore should aid in the dissemination of heat away from the resistor. 
It would be impossible to determine the actual hot spot temperature rise 
of resistor R33 without instrumenting and duplicating the overvoltage condition. 
However, it can be concluded the resistor did not exceed the l84°C temperature 
measured by the samples tested. In fact with the assistance of the stycast 
coating, it is highly probable the temperature did not exceed the l75°C which 
the manufacturer specifies as the maximum allowable temperature before 
degradation begins to occur. 
Even assuming the worst case condition of l84°C temperature rise, 
the measured ,C.,. R was only O. 33%. For the given application a resistance 
range of 100- 3K.../Lis acceptable before functional degradation will vCCUl', 
Therefore, it has been concluded by BxA Reliability that any parametric 
change in R33 as a result of the overvoltage condition, is inconsequential 
to the functional capability of the PCU and the reliability of the system. 
PSE - S/N 2 
The PSE was in stand-by with a dummy load connected to the PSE/CSE 
in place of the sensor when the overvoltage was applied. A review of ESC 
drawing 233011 rev. D, PSE block diagram, revealed that in the stand-by 
condition only the 29V survival power is applied to the PSE. Analysis of 
the Power Converter ''B", ESC drawing 324526 Rev. D, indicates that the 
applied overvoltage of 47. ZV stressed the survival heater circuit components 
to a maximum of 60% of their capability, Therefore, the PSE was not 
exposed to any detrimental operating conditions that would degrade the 
operational reliability. 
Figure 1 
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY 2334964 
